Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents by Gottlieb, Daniel & Zhang, Xingtan
Econometrica, Vol. 89, No. 2 (March, 2021), 793–824
LONG-TERM CONTRACTING WITH TIME-INCONSISTENT AGENTS
DANIEL GOTTLIEB
Department of Management, London School of Economics
XINGTAN ZHANG
Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder
We study contracts between naive present-biased consumers and risk-neutral firms.
We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon
grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers’ and on the firms’
side, when consumers cannot commit to long-term contracts, and when firms do not
know the consumers’ naiveté. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not
vanish when firms do not know the consumers’ present bias or when they cannot offer
exclusive contracts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A VAST LITERATURE in behavioral economics studies markets with present-biased con-
sumers who underestimate their bias (“partial naiveté”). An important finding from this
literature is that the equilibrium is inefficient and regulation that accounts for internalities
can increase welfare.1 Models in this literature generally have only three periods, which is
the minimum needed for present bias to play a role. But this is an unrealistic assumption
since, in these models, periods are thought to be very short, typically no more than a day
(O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015)).
Our paper considers a general contracting model with partially naive present-biased
consumers and an arbitrary number of periods. We show that to exploit consumer naiveté,
firms offer contracts with two options at each point in time: a “baseline” that provides high
consumption in the future in exchange for low consumption today, and an “alternative”
option that provides greater consumption today but less consumption in the future. In ev-
ery period, consumers think they will pick the baseline but pick the alternative option in-
stead, effectively postponing the reduction in consumption to the next period. As a result,
the equilibrium has smooth consumption in all but the last period. Because the relative
weight on the last period shrinks as the contracting horizon grows, the consumption on
the equilibrium path of present-biased consumers converges to the path that maximizes
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This result can be interpreted in two ways. If one takes the models as currently formu-
lated as good approximations of reality, then it suggests that there is no role for regula-
tion that corrects for present bias as long as contractual relationships are long enough.
If instead, one believes that inefficiency is prevalent in markets with present-biased con-
sumers, then something must be missing from how these markets are often modeled.
To understand which features can prevent efficiency in markets with present-biased con-
sumers, we extend the model in several directions.
First, we drop the assumption that consumers can commit to long-term contracts. Such
“one-sided commitment” is prevalent in many markets (e.g., life insurance, long-term
care, annuities, mortgages, and car loans).2 For a fixed horizon, removing commitment
power can help present-biased consumers, who are tempted to overborrow. Since firms
would not lend to consumers who can walk away from contracts, removing commitment
power limits their ability to borrow, increasing welfare when consumers are sufficiently
present biased.
We then generalize the vanishing inefficiency result for settings with one-sided com-
mitment, showing that the equilibrium converges to the path that maximizes the con-
sumer’s long-run preferences subject to non-lapsing constraints. Because the equilibrium
with commitment maximizes long-run preferences without these constraints, removing
commitment power cannot improve welfare when the contracting horizon is long enough.
Second, we show that the vanishing inefficiency result also holds when firms, rather than
consumers, have the bargaining power. However, the equilibrium converges to a different
point on the Pareto frontier. In the limit, consumers are worse off (according to their
long-run preferences) than with their outside option and firms obtain higher profits than
if they were facing consumers who maximized their long-run preferences. Nevertheless,
the outcome is efficient and only distributional concerns would justify interventions.
Third, we study how private information affects the equilibrium. When firms do not
know the consumer’s naiveté, the equilibrium remains unchanged and, therefore, is still
asymptotically efficient. Adding a sophisticated type also does not affect the equilibrium
contract of naive consumers, so the inefficiency from their contracts still vanishes as the
horizon grows. However, when firms do not know the consumer’s present bias, they face
an adverse selection problem that leads them to provide insufficient savings to more
present-biased types, and the equilibrium is no longer asymptotically efficient.
Fourth, we assume that consumers can simultaneously sign contracts with multiple
firms, so contracts are not exclusive. This is the case, for example, with credit cards and
many other loans. We show that contract non-exclusivity prevents any commitment from
being provided, so the equilibrium allocation remains inefficient no matter how long the
horizon is.
Fifth, we consider more general forms of present bias (beyond quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting). Since quasi-hyperbolic discounting only distorts decisions involving the current
period, one might think that with more general discount functions, the efficiency result
would break. We characterize the equilibrium for general present-biased discounting and
show that this conjecture is incorrect.
And sixth, we study contracting over effort and show that, in that case, the equilibrium
path is determined by the agent’s short-run discount, so the equilibrium remains ineffi-
cient regardless of the horizon. With effort, firms offer a baseline requiring all effort to
2In long-term insurance markets—such as life insurance, long-term care insurance, or annuities—
policyholders are allowed to cancel their policies at all times, but firms cannot drop them. In mortgages and
other credit markets, borrowers can prepay their debt, but debtors cannot force them to repay before the
contract is due.
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be exerted in the immediate future. On the equilibrium path, the agent keeps postponing
some effort one period into the future according to their short-run discount factor, which
is lower than their long-run discount factor due to present bias.
The main message of our paper is that the inefficiency of markets with present-biased
consumers crucially depends on the length of the relationship, on how easy it is to contract
with multiple firms, and on the information that firms have. When contracts are exclusive
and firms know the consumer’s present bias, the equilibrium is approximately efficient as
long as the contracting horizon is long enough.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model. In Sec-
tion 3, we discuss several extensions and their implications for welfare. Section 3.1 drops
the assumption that consumers can commit to long-term contracts, Section 3.2 assumes
that the bargaining power is on the firm’s rather than the consumer’s side, Section 3.3 in-
troduces heterogeneity, Section 3.4 assumes that contracts are not exclusive, Section 3.5
relaxes the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and Section 3.6 considers con-
tracting over effort. Then, Section 4 concludes. Appendices A–E are in the Supplemen-
tal Material (Gottlieb and Zhang (2021)); a supplementary appendix may be found at
https://personal.lse.ac.uk/gottlied/.
Related Literature. Our paper fits into a recent literature on contracting with behav-
ioral agents, summarized in Kőszegi (2014) and Grubb (2015). The basic model in Sec-
tion 2 builds on the credit card model of Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010) by considering
more than two consumption periods and allowing for uncertainty. Our paper is also re-
lated to a literature that studies commitment contracts with time-inconsistent agents (cf.
Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006), Halac and Yared (2014), Galberti (2015), Bond
and Sigurdsson (2017)).3
Section 3.1 is related to a literature on dynamic risk-sharing with one-sided com-
mitment. Several papers show that front-loaded payment schedules help mitigate a
consumer’s lack of commitment power. For example, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) theo-
retically and empirically examined how life insurers mitigate reclassification risk by offer-
ing front-loaded policies. More recently, Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2017) and Atal,
Fang, Karlsson, and Ziebarth (2018) showed that front-loaded long-term health insurance
contracts can produce substantial welfare gains by insuring policyholders against reclas-
sification risk. The main difference between these models and ours is that consumers in
our model are dynamically inconsistent.
2. BASIC MODEL
There is one consumer (agent) and a finite number of firms. Time is discrete and finite.
To allow for arbitrary non-stationary settings, we model the stochastic environment as fol-
lows. There is a finite state space St for each t ∈ N. The agent earns income w(st) at state
3There are two key differences between our paper and this literature. First, this literature considers sophis-
ticated agents, whereas our primary focus is on partially naive agents. Second, we study a different incentive
aspect. This literature studies the trade-off between commitment and flexibility (agents have commitment
power but, because they face an unverifiable taste shock, they value the flexibility to adjust to different taste
shocks), whereas, in Section 3.1, we study the agent’s incentive to lapse and recontract with other firms. Our
paper is also related to Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), who studied the interaction between government policy
and private commitments by present-biased voters, Heidhues and Strack (2019), who characterized stopping
behavior by time-inconsistent agents, and to Harris and Laibson (2001) and Cao and Werning (2018), who
studied the Markov equilibria in infinite-horizon problems with sophisticated consumers and showed there
can be multiple non-smooth equilibria. Multiplicity and non-smoothness do not arise in our setting because
our model has a finite (albeit arbitrary) horizon.
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st . Let p(st |sτ) denote the probability of reaching state st conditional on state sτ. We say
that state st follows state sτ if p(st |sτ) > 0. A state specifies all previously realized uncer-
tainty, so a state cannot follow two different states. We consider the T -period truncation
of this setting, that is, an environment with state spaces St and conditional probabilities
p(·|·) up to period T , at which point the game ends.
Without loss of generality, we assume that no uncertainty is realized before the initial
period: S1 = {∅}. Let E[·|st] denote the expectation operator conditional on state st and
let E[·] denote the unconditional (time-1) expectation. By taking degenerate distribu-
tions, our framework allows for deterministic income paths. Also, since the probabilities
of reaching future states may depend on the current state, our framework also allows
for persistent shocks, which is important to encompass environments with reclassification
risk.
Firms are risk neutral and can freely save or borrow at the interest rate R ≥ 1, so that
each firm maximizes its expected discounted profits. The expected profits at state sτ of a







The agent has quasi-hyperbolic discounting and needs a firm to transfer consumption











where β ∈ (01), δ ∈ (01], and u : R+ → R is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and twice continuously differentiable in the interior of its domain.5 We are in-
terested in time-inconsistent consumers who underestimate their bias—that is, they are
partially naive as defined by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Such a consumer believes
that, in all future periods, he will behave like someone with time-consistency parameter
β̂ ∈ (β1]. For brevity, we refer to a partially naive time-inconsistent consumer simply as a
time-inconsistent consumer.6 As a benchmark, we also consider the case of time-consistent
consumers (β̂ = β = 1). Following most of the literature, we take the agent’s long-run
preferences as the relevant ones in our welfare calculations.7 Therefore, consumers max-
imize welfare in the time-consistent benchmark but not when they are time inconsistent.
For now, we assume that firms know the consumer’s preferences. We also assume that
the consumer has all bargaining power and that all parties can commit to long-term con-
4The assumption that the agent cannot perfectly transfer resources across states without a firm is not in-
nocuous (see Section 3.4). As shown by Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2015), it may also be related
to why lab experiments often fail to find evidence of present bias. This assumption is probably better suited
for contracts involving larger amounts (such as mortgages or life insurance policies) which cannot be easily
financed through other means.
5Continuity rules out utility functions that are unbounded from below, which is important for equilibrium
existence. One can incorporate unbounded utility functions by assuming that the consumer has a minimum
(subsistence) level of consumption and renormalizing that level to zero.
6Appendix D of the Supplemental Material considers sophisticates, who fully understand their time incon-
sistency (β̂= β).
7See, for example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001).
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tracts, so the consumer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract in the first period,
which is honored until the game ends. These three assumptions are dropped in Section 3.
When an individual is not time consistent, his ranking of consumption streams depends
on when the stream is evaluated. As usual, we model the behavior of such an agent by
treating his decision in each period as if it was decided by a different “self.” Because the
consumer is naive, each self may mispredict how his future selves will choose. We consider
perception-perfect equilibria (O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001)), which require that:
(i) each self picks an optimal strategy given its prediction of how future selves will behave,
and (ii) predictions about the behavior of future selves must be consistent with how a
future self with time-consistency parameter β̂ would choose.8
2.1. Time-Consistent Consumers
As a benchmark, we first consider a time-consistent consumer. Because parties can




















Indeed, no firm would accept a contract with negative expected profits. If profits were
positive, the agent would benefit by offering a contract with slightly higher consumption.
Because the objective function in (2) is strictly concave and (3) is a linear constraint, there
is a unique solution. So, any equilibrium of the game provides the same consumption,
which solves the program above. Let W CT denote the equilibrium welfare of the time-
consistent consumer, which evaluates the objective (2) at the equilibrium consumption.
2.2. Time-Inconsistent Consumers
Before presenting a general analysis of equilibrium with time-inconsistent consumers,
we start with a simple illustrative example. There are T = 3 periods and there is no un-
certainty. The net interest rate is zero (R = 1) and the agent’s total income equals one
(w1 +w2 +w3 = 1). The agent is fully naive (β̂= 1), has discount factors β= 12 and δ= 1,
and utility function u(c)= √c.
Based on Section 2.1, one may think that the equilibrium consumption maximizes the




c1 +β(√c2 + √c3) (4)
8See Appendix E of the Supplemental Material for a formal definition. As we show there, there is no loss of
generality in restricting attention to pure strategies. Our game-theoretical equilibrium concept coincides with
the non-strategic competitive equilibrium of Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010). We formulate the model as a game
because it can be more straightforwardly generalized to settings with one-sided commitment (Section 3.1),
monopoly (3.2), private information (3.3), and contracting over effort (3.6).
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subject to
c1 + c2 + c3 = 1 (5)
We will show that this is not the case. To see this, first note that the solution to this program
is c1 = 23 , c2 = c3 = 16 , which gives the agent a utility of
√
3/2.
Suppose a firm decides to offer a contract that gives c1 = 827 in the first period and allows
the agent to pick between two different options in the second period: a baseline and an
alternative option. The baseline provides as little consumption as possible in the second
period in exchange for a high consumption in the future: c2(B) = 0 and c3(B) = 5027 . The
alternative option offers a smoother path: c2(A) = 827 and c3(A)= 781 .
Since the agent thinks that his future selves are perfectly patient, he believes that he
will pick the baseline option:√
c2(B)+
√













Therefore, the agent accepts to switch to this new contract.









And because the agent ends up with the alternative option, the firm makes a profit of
1 − c1 − c2(A)− c3(A) ≈ 032
That is, a flexible contract allows the firm to exploit the agent’s incorrect beliefs and make
positive profits. The firm exploits the difference in beliefs by offering a baseline option
with very low consumption in period 2 (c2(B) = 0) in exchange for a large future con-
sumption (c3(B) = 5027 ). And while the agent thinks that he will choose this baseline op-
tion, he ends up switching to the alternative option, which has a lower NPV but a higher
immediate consumption (c2(A) = 827 , c3(A)= 781 ).
Having shown that we cannot have an equilibrium with inflexible contracts in this simple
example, we now characterize the equilibrium in the general case.
2.2.1. Equilibrium
Any contract that is accepted with positive probability must maximize the consumer’s
utility in period 1 subject to two types of constraints: zero profits, which is the same as
before, and incentive constraints, which are due to consumer naiveté.
Because the consumer mispredicts his future preferences, he may disagree with the
firm about the actions that his future selves will take. So we need to distinguish between
what the consumer thinks he will choose and what firms think that the consumer will
choose (which we interpret as the correct beliefs). This disagreement gives rise to two
sets of incentive constraints. Following Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010), we refer to them as
perceived choice (PC) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
PC requires the consumer to believe that his future selves will choose the actions that
maximize his perceived utility. IC requires firms to believe that the consumer’s future
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FIGURE 1.—Option histories with T = 4 and no uncertainty. The consumer initially believes he will choose
the baseline in each node, which would give him consumption (c1 c2(B) c3(BB) c4(BB)). In each node,
he switches to the alternative. In period 2, he receives c2(A) and thinks that he will get (c3(AB) c4(AB)).
Then, he switches to the alternative again in period 3, obtaining (c3(AA) c4(AA)). The consumption vector
consists of consumption in all nodes, whereas the consumption path is (c1 c2(A) c3(AA) c4(AA)). With
uncertainty, consumption also depends on the state of the world.
selves will choose the actions that maximize the consumer’s true utility. The option that
the consumer thinks that his future selves will choose is called the baseline option (B).
The option that firms think that the consumer’s future selves will choose is called the
alternative option (A). In principle, these options can coincide, in which case the consumer
and the firms agree on which actions will be chosen. But we will show that, in equilibrium,
these options are always different.9
A time-t option history ht is a list of options chosen by the consumer up to time t:
h1 = ∅, h2 ∈ {(A) (B)}, h3 ∈ {(AA) (AB) (BA) (BB)}, etc. Since there are no ac-
tions after the last period, there is no space for disagreement at t = T , so that hT = hT−1.
Figure 1 depicts the option histories when there are four periods.
A consumption vector specifies the agent’s consumption in all states that happen with
positive probability for all option histories:10
c ≡ {(c(s1) c(s2h2) c(s3h3)     c(sT hT )) : p(s2|s1)p(s3|s2) · · ·p(sT |sT−1) > 0}
A consumption path specifies the consumption that happens with positive probability us-
ing correct beliefs about the options that the consumer chooses:
cE ≡ {(c(s1) c(s2A) c(s3AA)     c(sT A    A)) :
p(s2|s1)p(s3|s2) · · ·p(sT |sT−1) > 0
}

9See Yildiz (2003) for another game in which different prior beliefs may cause players to disagree about
which actions will be taken in equilibrium.
10Since a state of the world encodes all previously realized uncertainty, the distribution over future states
conditional on st can only have full support in the trivial case in which no uncertainty is realized until state st .
We omit the subscript T from the consumption vector c to simplify notation.
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Note that, unlike the consumption vector, the consumption path only includes outcomes
conditional on the consumer repeatedly picking option A.




















w(st)− c(stAA    A)
Rt−1
]
















hτ−1BB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]


























hτ−1AB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]








hτ−1BB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ] (IC)
The following lemma establishes that the equilibrium program (P) characterizes the
equilibrium consumption vector:
LEMMA 1: c is the consumption vector in a perception-perfect equilibrium if and only if it
solves program (P).
2.2.2. Auxiliary Program
Consider a dynamically consistent agent who differs from the one described in Sec-
tion 2.1 in that he discounts consumption in the last period by an additional factor β. The













subject to the zero-profits constraint (3). The auxiliary program has a unique solution
since the objective function is strictly concave and the constraint is linear.
The following lemma establishes that the consumption path for time-inconsistent
agents coincides with the solution of the auxiliary program:
LEMMA 2: cE is the consumption path in a perception-perfect equilibrium if and only if it
solves the auxiliary program.
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The auxiliary program highlights that underweighting consumption in the last period is
the only distortion from time inconsistency in this model. To illustrate the lemma, suppose
there are four periods and income is constant (w). Because there is no uncertainty, we can





























) + β̂[δu(c3(BB)) + δ2u(c4(BB))]




) +β[δu(c3(AB)) + δ2u(c4(AB))]








) +βδu(c4(AA)) ≥ u(c3(AB)) +βδu(c4(AB)) (13)
where (9) is the zero-profits constraint, (10) and (11) are the PC and IC constraints in
period 2, and (12) and (13) are the PC and IC constraints in period 3.
First, note that the IC constraints (11) and (13) must both bind. Otherwise, it would be
possible to achieve a higher utility by increasing c4(BB) and c4(AB).11 Substitute these




) + δ2u(c3(AA)) +βδ3u(c4(AA))
− (1 −β)[δu(c2(B)) + δ2u(c3(AB))] (14)
Use the binding ICs again to rewrite the PC constraints (10) and (12) as monotonicity
conditions:
c2(A) ≥ c2(B) (15)
and
c3(AA)≥ c3(AB) (16)
So the program reduces to the maximization of (14) subject to zero profits (9) and the
monotonicity conditions (15) and (16). Because the objective function (14) is decreasing
in c2(B) and c3(AB), the solution entails
c2(B)= c3(AB) = 0 (17)
Equation (17) implies that the monotonicity conditions (15) and (16) automatically
hold. Substitute c2(B)= c3(AB)= 0 in the objective function (14) to obtain the auxiliary








simultaneously by a small amount, which
keeps (9)-(12) unaffected and raises the objective.







) + δ2u(c3(AA)) +βδ3u(c4(AA)) (18)
subject to the zero-profit condition (9).
To understand why the baseline offers the lowest consumption possible in period 2,
consider the following perturbation argument. Starting from any interior c2(B), lower
u(c2(B)) by ε > 0 and raise u(c4(BB)) by εβδ2 . This perturbation keeps the IC (11) un-
changed but increases the objective (8) by δβ( 1
β
− 1)ε > 0. This is because the objective
function evaluates consumption from the perspective of self 1, whereas the IC (11) eval-
uates it according to self 2’s preferences. Since the agent is present biased, shifting con-
sumption into the future while keeping his self-2 utility constant increases his utility from
the perspective of self 1. Therefore, the solution of the program shifts as much consump-
tion as possible to the last period: c2(B)= 0.
To summarize, the consumer thinks he will pick the baseline option. Since he under-
estimates the present bias of his time-2 self, the baseline provides as little consumption
as possible in period 2 in return for higher future consumption. The firm accepts to of-
fer higher consumption in the future because it knows that the consumer’s future selves
will not pick the baseline. Instead, the firm offers an alternative option that induces the
consumer’s future self to switch.
With more than 4 periods, the consumer initially thinks that he will follow the option
path (BB    B). The firm designs the options to induce him to keep switching to the al-
ternative. Because each future self is more present biased than the consumer anticipates,
the cheapest way to induce switching from (BB    B) to (AB    B) is to postpone
the reduction in consumption from period 2 to period 3. The switching decision is made
by the period-2 self, which discounts the future starting at period 3 by an additional β.
Then, in period 3, the alternative option needs to again induce the agent to switch from
(ABB    B) to (AAB    B), which is done by postponing the reduction in con-
sumption into period 4. That decision is made by the period-3 self, which discounts the
future starting at period 4 by an additional β. This argument proceeds until we reach pe-
riod T − 1, when the consumer can no longer push the reduction in consumption further
into the future. Since there is only one period left, consumer and firms can no longer
disagree about when the reduction in consumption will happen. Thus, on the equilib-
rium path (AA    A), the factor β only applies to the last period. Intuitively, each
self postpones the reduction in consumption one period into the future (by choosing the
alternative option rather than the baseline) until the last period.
Recall that we used the binding ICs—equations (11) and (13)—and equation (17) to
eliminate the baseline options from the auxiliary program. Substituting the solution of
the auxiliary program back in these equations, we can recover the baseline options. Since
neither the auxiliary program nor these equations depend on the consumer’s naiveté pa-
rameter, it follows that, in equilibrium, both the baseline and the alternative options are
not functions of β̂.
COROLLARY 1: There exists a perception-perfect equilibrium that does not depend on the
consumer’s naiveté β̂ ∈ (β1]. Moreover, any perception-perfect equilibrium has the same
consumption path, which is continuous in β ∈ (01].
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2.2.3. Vanishing Inefficiency
We now use Lemma 2 to obtain our main result. Let W IT denote the equilibrium welfare
of the time-inconsistent consumer, which evaluates the consumption path according to
the agent’s long-run preferences (2), and recall that W CT is the welfare of a time-consistent
consumer. Since the time-consistent consumer maximizes welfare, the welfare loss from
dynamic inconsistency is W CT −W IT ≥ 0.
THEOREM 1: Suppose u is bounded and δ < 1. Then, limT↗+∞(W CT −W IT )= 0.
The theorem states that the welfare loss from dynamic inconsistency converges to zero
as the contracting length grows. The assumption that u is bounded and δ < 1 ensures that
the discounted welfare converges.12
Recall that the only inefficiency from time inconsistency is underweighting the last pe-
riod. Because the effect of the last period vanishes as the number of periods grows, the
solution of the auxiliary program converges to the equilibrium consumption with time-
consistent consumers as T ↗ +∞. So, even though the time-inconsistent consumer does
not maximize his welfare function and has incorrect beliefs, in any equilibrium, he ob-
tains approximately the maximum welfare possible if the number of periods is large. In
fact, it is precisely the fact that the agent has incorrect beliefs that causes the inefficiency
to vanish, since the optimal way to exploit the agent’s naiveté is to offer contracts that
postpone the reduction in consumption until the last period. In Appendix D of the Sup-
plemental Material, we show that the inefficiency does not vanish when the consumer is
sophisticated.
3. EXTENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
3.1. One-Sided Commitment
We now assume that consumers cannot commit to long-term contracts. As argued in the
Introduction, this type of one-sided commitment is common in many markets, including
life insurance, long-term care, annuities, mortgages, and car loans. Moreover, regulations
that allow consumers to terminate agreements at will are often motivated by an attempt to
protect them. However, in standard models, removing a rational consumer’s commitment
power can only hurt the consumer.
Our setting is a natural candidate for studying the effect of regulating commitment
power, because committing to future actions and lapsing on previous agreements are
inherently intertemporal decisions, and present bias is the most well-studied bias in in-
tertemporal decision-making. Moreover, there is evidence that present bias is an impor-
tant feature in some credit markets where regulation prevents consumers from being able
to commit to long-term contracts, such as in mortgage or credit card markets.13
12Along with δ < 1, assuming bounded utility is sufficient to ensure that discounted welfare converges, but
can be substantially relaxed. When the discounted welfare does not converge, similar results can be obtained
using other criteria (see Section 3.5).
13See Schlafmann (2021), Ghent (2011), and Atlas, Johnson, and Payne (2017) for evidence of present bias
in mortgage markets, and Meier and Sprenger (2010) for credit card markets. Our equilibrium pattern of
repeatedly postponing repayments is broadly consistent with the findings from Carter, Liu, Skiba, and Sydnor
(2017) on payday loans. See also Sulka (2020), who calibrated a model of retirement saving and found that
present bias lowers the representative household’s pension wealth by 10%.
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We keep the assumption that the consumer has all bargaining power and model one-
sided commitment as follows. The consumer offers a contract in each period. If a firm has
accepted a contract, the consumer decides whether to keep it or replace it with a new one.
If multiple firms accept a contract, the consumer picks each of them with some positive
probability.14
3.1.1. Benchmark: Time-Consistent Consumers
Consider first the benchmark case of a time-consistent consumer. With one-sided com-
mitment, the consumer can freely switch to a new contract (“lapse”) as long as he can find
a firm willing to provide such contract. To obtain the equilibrium consumption, there is no
loss of generality in restricting attention to contracts in which the consumer never lapses.15
Therefore, the equilibrium consumption must satisfy non-lapsing constraints, which re-
quire that the consumer’s outside option at any state does not exceed the value from
keeping the original contract.16
The outside option at state sτ is defined by the recursion


























)∣∣∣sτ̃] ≥ V C(sτ̃) ∀sτ̃ with p(sτ̃|sτ) > 0 (21)
Equation (20) is the zero-profits condition and (21) is the non-lapsing condition of the
new contract. The equilibrium consumption with one-sided commitment solves this pro-
gram at period 1.
While one can use program (19)–(21) to obtain the equilibrium consumption by back-
ward induction, there is an easier approach when the consumer is time consistent. Con-
sider, instead, the program that replaces non-lapsing constraints by the requirement that,
14In this formulation, the only cost of walking away from a contract is the forgone payments made into
that contract. This assumption is appropriate to insurance settings, where policyholders are allowed to drop
coverage at no additional cost by stopping to pay their premiums (see Hendel and Lizzeri (2003), Handel,
Hendel, and Whinston (2017)). In some markets (such as mortgages or car loans), the cost also includes the
loss of the collateral, whereas in others there are also reputational costs. With present-biased preferences, the
timing of these costs matters. For example, with immediate costs, a naive consumer may think he will incur the
cost and leave, but end up deciding not to. With delayed costs, a naive consumer may think he will not walk
away from a contract, but end up doing so.
15To see this, consider an equilibrium in which the consumer lapses in some state of the world, replacing the
original contract with a contract from another firm. Since the other firm cannot lose money by offering this
new contract, the old firm could have accepted a contract that substituted the terms of the old contract from
this period on with the terms of the new contract, and the consumer would have remained with the old firm.
16When a non-lapsing constraint binds, there are also equilibria in which the consumer lapses and recon-
tracts with another firm. These equilibria are equivalent to the one with no lapsing in the sense that the con-
sumer obtains the same consumption and all firms make the same profits.
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∣∣∣sτ] ≤ 0 ∀sτ (22)
We refer to (22) as front-loading constraints. Contracts satisfying (20) and (22) cannot have
negative accumulated profits at any time, so the consumer initially overpays the firm and
is repaid later. This overpayment discourages the consumer from switching contracts.
In general, front-loading constraints are weaker than non-lapsing constraints: if the
continuation contract gave positive expected profits at some state, a consumer would be
able to increase his utility by replacing it with another contract that gives zero profits.
When consumers are dynamically consistent, however, maximizing (19) subject to either
(20) and (21) or (20) and (22) gives the same solutions.17 Since (19) is a strictly concave
function and (20) and (22) are linear constraints, consumption is the same in any equilib-
rium of the game.
3.1.2. Time-Inconsistent Consumers
We now turn to the more interesting case of a time-inconsistent consumer. As with
time-consistent consumers, the equilibrium with one-sided commitment must satisfy non-
lapsing constraints. Yet, because the parties may disagree about which options will be
chosen, we need to distinguish between non-lapsing constraints according to the beliefs
of the consumer and the beliefs of firms. Equilibrium requires both of them to hold. To
write down these constraints, we first define the outside options recursively.
The actual outside option at state sτ given option history hτ is the highest utility that the


















hττB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]








hττAA    A
))
Rt−τ
∣∣∣sτ] = 0 (23)
















hτ̃−1τ AB    B
















hτ̃−1τ BB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ̃] ≥ V̂ I(sτ̃) (25)
17To see this, suppose a solution to the program subject to (20) and (22) did not satisfy the non-lapsing
constraints (21). Then, there would exist a continuation contract that gives zero profits while increasing the
consumer’s continuation utility. Substituting the original continuation contract by this new one would then
increase the consumer’s utility while giving nonnegative profits at t = 1, contradicting the optimality of the
original contract.
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for all sτ̃ following sτ and all hτ̃τ that are continuation histories of h
τ, where V̂ is the
“perceived outside option,” which we define next.
The perceived outside option at state sτ given option history hτ is the highest utility that


















hττBB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]
subject to (PC), (IC), zero profits (23), and the non-lapsing constraints (24)–(25).
The equilibrium program with one-sided commitment (P′) adds the non-lapsing con-
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hτ−1AB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]
≥ V I(sτ) ∀sτ (NL)
















hτ−1BB    B
)))∣∣∣sτ]
≥ V̂ I(sτ) ∀sτ (PNL)
It may seem counterintuitive to impose perceived non-lapsing constraints, since they
are associated with histories that are off the equilibrium path. But equilibrium requires
the consumer to pick his optimal actions given how he thinks his future selves will be-
have. If (PNL) did not hold, the consumer would not expect his future selves to choose
the baseline option, and so the solution of program (P′) would not be an equilibrium
consumption.
LEMMA 3: c is the consumption vector of a perception-perfect equilibrium of the one-sided
commitment model if and only if it solves program (P′).
3.1.3. Auxiliary Program and Vanishing Inefficiency
We now show that, as in the model with two-sided commitment, the consumption path
coincides with the equilibrium with a dynamically consistent agent who discounts the last
period by an additional factor β. Since this agent is dynamically consistent, we can replace
the non-lapsing constraints by front-loading constraints (as in Section 2.1). Therefore, the
auxiliary program with one-sided commitment maximizes (7) subject to the zero-profits (3)
and front-loading (22) constraints. This program has a unique solution since the objective
function is strictly concave and the constraints are linear.
LEMMA 4: cE is the consumption path in a perception-perfect equilibrium of the one-sided
commitment model if and only if it solves the auxiliary program with one-sided commitment.
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The proof of the lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 with one additional step, in
which we verify that the perceived non-lapsing constraints do not bind and can therefore
be ignored. This step is needed for us to remove baseline consumption from the equilib-
rium program. The fact that PNL does not bind follows from two observations. First, PNL
depends on the individual’s perceived time-consistency parameter β̂, while non-lapsing
constraints depend on the true β. So, holding a consumption stream constant, NL implies
PNL. Second, because the individual saves more in the baseline than in the alternative
option, whenever future consumption in the alternative option is large enough to ensure
that the agent does not lapse, future consumption in the baseline option must also be
large enough to prevent lapsing.18
As in the case of two-sided commitment, Lemma 4 implies that the welfare loss from
dynamic inconsistency vanishes as the contracting length grows. Let W ′CT and W
′I
T denote
the equilibrium welfare of time-consistent (Section 3.1.1) and time-inconsistent (Sec-
tion 3.1.2) consumers, respectively.
THEOREM 2: Suppose u is bounded and δ < 1. Then, limT↗+∞(W ′CT −W ′IT )= 0.
To understand the welfare effect of removing commitment power, we now compare the
equilibrium with one- and two-sided commitment. Recall that a time-inconsistent agent
gets the same consumption path as a dynamically consistent agent who under-weights
the last period by an additional factor β. Commitment power allows him to smooth con-
sumption in the first T −1 periods while leaving too little consumption for the last period.
This underconsumption in the last period is large when the consumer is sufficiently time
inconsistent (β is low), in which case the last period consumption is close to zero. So, if
underconsuming in the last period hurts the agent enough and β is low, the agent is better
off without commitment.19
As the contracting length grows, however, the relative weight of the last period shrinks,
making it increasingly difficult for the time-inconsistent consumer to obtain higher wel-
fare without commitment. In fact, it follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that removing com-
mitment power cannot increase welfare if the contracting length is large enough. To see
this, recall that a time-consistent consumer with commitment power maximizes welfare
subject to zero profits. Removing commitment power is equivalent to introducing front-
loading constraints, so his welfare with one-sided commitment cannot be higher. But,
since the welfare of time-inconsistent consumers converges to the welfare of the time-
consistent consumer, the same must be true for time-inconsistent consumers when T is
large.
To summarize, while removing commitment power can help present-biased consumers
when the contracting horizon is small, it cannot help when the horizon is large.
3.2. Market Power
Our previous analysis assumes that the consumer had all the bargaining power. We
now consider the case in which the bargaining power is on the firm’s side. Since the firm
can commit to a long-term contract, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the
firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the consumer at time 1. If the consumer rejects
18In the supplementary appendix on the author’s website, we also generalize Corollary 1 to the one-sided
commitment model.
19See the supplementary appendix for a formal statement and proof.
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the firm’s offer, he gets c ≡ {c(st) : st ∈ St  t = 1    T }. This is the consumer’s outside
option, that is, his best way to smooth consumption if he turns down the firm’s offer.20
The consumer accepts the firm’s offer if and only if his perceived utility from the contract
is weakly higher than the perceived utility from the outside option.
We assume that, for all T , the expected NPV of the agent’s income is bounded and












for some K > 0. The inequality on the left in (26) ensures that the firm can find a prof-
itable contract that the agent accepts, whereas the one on the right ensures that the ex-
pected NPV of income converges as the horizon T goes to infinity. We also assume that
the outside option provides positive consumption in at least one state after the first pe-
riod:21
c(st) > 0 for some st with t > 1 and p(st |∅) > 0 (27)
Conditions (26) and (27) ensure that there exists a nontrivial solution to the firm’s pro-
gram.
Let Ŵ CT (c) and Ŵ
I
T (c) denote the equilibrium welfare of time-consistent and time-
inconsistent consumers, respectively, and let ΠCT (c) and Π
I
T (c) denote the firm’s equilib-
rium profit when the consumer is time consistent and time inconsistent. Picking different
outside options for a time-consistent consumer (who maximizes welfare), we obtain dif-
ferent points on the Pareto frontier. Formally, let PT ≡ {(Ŵ CT (c′)ΠCT (c′))}∀c′ denote the
set of consumer welfare and firm profits on the Pareto frontier. Let P∞ ≡ limT↗+∞ PT
denote the limit of the Pareto frontier as the contracting horizon grows.
The theorem below presents the vanishing inefficiency result when the bargaining
power is on the firm’s side:
THEOREM 3: Suppose u is bounded and δ < 1. Then:
1. limT↗+∞(Ŵ IT (c)Π
I
T (c)) ∈P∞,




3. limT↗+∞ ΠIT (c) > limT↗+∞ Π
C
T (c).
Part 1 states that the equilibrium converges to an efficient allocation. However, un-
like when the bargaining power is on the consumer’s side, the limit is different from the
equilibrium of a time-consistent consumer with the same outside option. The consumer’s
welfare converges to a point below his opportunity cost, which is the equilibrium welfare of
a time-consistent consumer (Part 2), whereas the firm’s profits converge to a point above
20Specifying an outside option in terms of consumption rather than a reservation utility makes the compar-
ison between the allocations of individuals with different utility functions (in this case, time-inconsistent and
time-consistent individuals) more transparent.
21If condition (27) fails, the outside option provides all consumption in the first period, which gives the
same utility to naive and time-consistent consumers. In that case, in equilibrium, the agent will get the same
perceived consumption as his outside option in all but the last period. Then, as the horizon grows, the equi-
librium welfare of naive and time-consistent consumers will converge to the same point. That is, when the
agent’s outside option only pays in the first period, firms are unable to “exploit” consumers (as will be shown
in Theorem 3).
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what it would get if the consumer were time consistent (Part 3). Since the consumer has
incorrect beliefs about his future choices, he overestimates the value of the contract. The
firm then “exploits” the consumer’s naiveté, giving him a welfare below his outside option
and obtaining greater profits than it would get if the consumer maximized his long-run
preferences.
3.3. Consumer Heterogeneity
In Section 2, we assumed that firms know the consumer’s preferences. We now briefly
describe what happens if firms do not know either the consumer’s naiveté or time-
consistency parameters. For a formal analysis, see Appendix A of the Supplemental Ma-
terial.
3.3.1. Unknown Naiveté
When firms do not know the consumer’s naiveté, all consumers get their full-
information contracts in any equilibrium. Suppose first that all consumers are naive and
recall that the naive consumer’s full-information contract does not depend on his naiveté
(Corollary 1). Then, all consumers receive the same contract and their welfare loss van-
ishes as the contracting horizon grows (as in Theorem 1).
Next, suppose there are also sophisticated consumers. Although naive and sophisti-
cated consumers have different full-information contracts, neither of them prefers some-
one else’s contract. When faced with the naive consumer’s full-information contract, a
sophisticated consumer understands that his future selves will pick the alternative op-
tions. Therefore, he prefers his full-information contract, which does not give flexibility
to his future selves. Because naive consumers think they will stick with the baseline, they
have a higher perceived utility from their own full-information contract. Then, the welfare
loss from time inconsistency vanishes for all naive consumers as the contracting horizon
grows (but not for sophisticated ones).
3.3.2. Unknown Time Inconsistency
Suppose now that the firm does not know the consumer’s time-consistency parameter
β ∈ (0 β̂]. Note that the model allows some consumers to be sophisticated (when β̂ < 1)
or time consistent (β̂ = 1). When the contracting horizon is large enough, there is no
equilibrium in which multiple consumers get their full-information contracts. If multiple
consumers received their full-information contracts, the more time-consistent of them
would pick another consumer’s full-information contract and choose the baseline rather
than the alternative option. The firm offering this contract would lose money, since base-
line options are unprofitable decoys not meant to be chosen on the equilibrium path.
In the only equilibrium that survives the D1 criterion, consumers get the “least costly
separating allocation.” In this allocation, only the most time-consistent consumer gets
his full-information contract when the horizon is large. All other contracts are distorted
to prevent deviations by more time-consistent consumers, making them save less than
with full information. Moreover, this informational inefficiency does not vanish as the
contracting horizon grows. In particular, when there is a time-consistent consumer (β̂ =
β= 1), he is the only one who receives an efficient contract. When there is a sophisticated
consumer (β̂ = β < 1), no consumer gets an asymptotically efficient contract (since the
welfare loss of sophisticates does not vanish).
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To summarize, with heterogeneous naiveté parameters, consumers receive their full-
information contract in any equilibrium, and the welfare loss from time inconsistency van-
ishes as the horizon grows. On the other hand, with heterogeneous time-consistency pa-
rameters, only the most time-consistent consumer receives his full-information contract.
Because firms worry that consumers will pick the contracts designed for more present-
biased consumers and stick with the baseline, less time-consistent types get an allocation
with insufficient savings, and this informational inefficiency persists as the horizon grows.
3.4. Non-Exclusive Contracts
In Section 2, we assumed that the consumer cannot simultaneously contract with mul-
tiple firms (i.e., contracts are exclusive). While, in Section 3.1, we allowed consumers to
drop contracts and recontract with other firms, we kept the exclusivity assumption. This is
a reasonable assumption in markets such as auto, property, or health insurance, where the
consumer cannot be reimbursed by multiple insurers for the same loss. In some other mar-
kets, such as credit cards or life insurance, consumers are able to simultaneously contract
with multiple firms—that is, contracts are not exclusive. We now describe the equilibrium
with non-exclusive contracts (see Appendix B of the Supplemental Material for all formal
results).
With non-exclusivity, firms cannot add unprofitable options that naive consumers think
they will choose but end up not choosing. If offered the contract from Section 2, for
example, the consumer would borrow from another firm to finance the fees specified
in the baseline. Therefore, equilibrium contracts must make zero profits along both the
equilibrium path and the consumer’s perceived path. Moreover, consumers are able to
undo any previous commitment.
Formally, we establish an equivalence between this model and a consumption-savings
problem with no illiquid assets. The consumer is endowed with the expected PDV of in-
come at the start. The only asset available is a risk-free bond that pays a gross return R.
The consumer chooses how much to save in each period. The perception-perfect equi-
librium is obtained by backward induction taking into account how much each self thinks
that his future selves will save. This consumption-savings problem corresponds to a bench-
mark case in which there are no commitment devices: savings in each period are decided
by the individual’s current self given his incorrect beliefs about his future choices.22
The equilibrium with non-exclusive contracts is inefficient both because firms do not
provide commitment devices and because the individual has mistaken beliefs about his
future choices. It is straightforward to construct uniform bounds on consumer welfare in
this model, so the vanishing inefficiency result fails to hold.
3.5. General Discounting Functions
So far, we have assumed that consumers have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which is the
most standard model of present bias. With quasi-hyperbolic discounting, there is a stark
distinction between now and the future. While, in each period, the individual has a higher
preference for consumption in that period, he agrees with his previous selves on how to
compare consumption in any two periods in the future. Psychologists have proposed a
22As pointed out by Laibson (1997) and Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), investing in illiquid assets is a way
for individuals to commit to a path of consumption.
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different model of present bias, based on a hyperbolic functional form. With hyperbolic
discounting, the individual becomes gradually more impatient as a period approaches.
In this subsection, we consider the model from Section 2 with general present-biased
preferences. To simplify exposition, we assume that the consumer has a constant income
w in each period. At time τ, the agent evaluates a consumption stream {ct}t≥τ according




where the discount factor Dt > 0 is strictly decreasing in t and D0 = 1.
It is well known that preferences represented by (28) are time consistent if and only







for all t = 01    , with strict inequality for at least one t. Present bias means that the
individual becomes (weakly) more impatient as a period approaches, with at least one
period in which she becomes strictly more impatient.23 With quasi-hyperbolic discounting,
(29) holds as an equality in all but the first period, whereas the inequality is strict in all
periods with hyperbolic discounting.
Let (D̂1 D̂2   ) denote the agent’s beliefs about the discount factor of his future selves,
where, as before, we normalize D̂0 = 1. A sophisticated agent knows that his future selves
will have the same discount factor as he has: D̂t = Dt for all t. A naive consumer under-





for all t = 01    , with strict inequality for at least one t. Note that, with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, this inequality becomes the usual condition: β̂ > β.
The next proposition generalizes Lemma 2, characterizing the consumption path as the
solution to a simpler auxiliary program:
PROPOSITION 1: The consumption path of a naive agent coincides with the equilibrium of





u(c3)+ · · · + DT−1
D1
u(cT−1)+DT−1u(cT ) (30)
To understand the coefficients in equation (30), consider the case of four periods and
no uncertainty as in Figure 1. For simplicity (and without loss of generality), let u(0)= 0.





23See Prelec (1989) and DeJarnette, Dillenberger, Gottlieb, and Ortoleva (2020). Note that (29) holds as an
equality for all t if and only if the discount function is exponential, so preferences are time consistent.
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) +D1u(c4(AA)) ≥ u(c3(AB)) +D1u(c4(AB))
As in the sketch of the proof of Lemma 2, the baseline option shifts all intermediate
consumption to the last period:
c2(B)= c3(BB)= c3(AB) = 0 (31)
Intuitively, because of present bias, self 1 benefits by shifting consumption to the future at
a rate that keeps his future selves indifferent (thereby preserving incentive compatibility).
Both ICs must bind (otherwise, the agent would benefit from increasing his baseline












+ u(c4(AA)) = u(c4(BB)) (32)
Equation (32) specifies the period-2 utility needed to convince the agent to switch from
the baseline. Since self 2 discounts consumption in the last period by D2, for each increase
in the last-period perceived utility u(c4(BB)), the firm must either raise u(c2(A)) by 1D2 ,
u(c3(AA)) by 1D1 , or u(c4(AA)) by 1. But because the time-1 self discounts last-period
utility by D3, we must multiply these terms by D3 to obtain the consumer’s perceived
utility at the time of contracting as a function of the alternative options chosen by his
future selves. More generally, the coefficients in the objective function (30) are the ratio
between how the period-1 self and the period-t self value consumption in the last period.
These discount rates appear because the contract needs to convince each future self to
switch to the alternative, rather than sticking to the baseline and waiting until the last
period to consume.
Comparing the coefficients in (30) with the agent’s discount factor Dt , we find that the
equilibrium program assigns a lower weight on first-period consumption than the agent’s
utility function. The need to convince future selves to switch requires offering alternative
options that take the consumer’s future preferences into account. Since a sophisticated
consumer would maximize self-1’s utility subject to zero profits, it follows that a naive
consumer always saves more than a sophisticate in the first period.24
Proposition 1 sheds light on how the shape of the discount function determines the
equilibrium. With quasi-hyperbolic discounting, (7) and (30) coincide. The example below
considers a generalization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which allows the immediate
future to be treated differently than a more distant future:
EXAMPLE 1: Consider a consumer with discount function D1 = βδ and Dt = βγδt for
t ≥ 2, where 0 < β ≤ γ ≤ 1 and δ ∈ (01). The consumer believes that in future periods,
he will behave as someone with parameters β̂ ≥ β and γ̂ ≥ γ, with at least one of these
two inequalities strict (so the consumer is naive). Note that this model reduces to quasi-
hyperbolic discounting when γ = γ̂ = 1.




24See the supplementary appendix on the author’s website for a formal proof.
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subject to zero profits. Here, present bias leads to the underweighting of consumption in
the last two periods, with the last period being more distorted than the previous one. By
the same argument as in Theorem 1, the inefficiency from present bias vanishes as the
contracting horizon grows.
As the previous example illustrates, the vanishing inefficiency result generalizes to
smoother versions of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We now turn to the case of hyperbolic
discounting:
Dt = 11 + kt  (33)
where k ≥ 0 is the “time-inconsistency parameter.” The agent is time consistent if k = 0
and time inconsistent if k > 0. A naive agent has time-inconsistency parameter k > 0 but
believes that, in the future, he will behave as an agent with time-inconsistency parameter
k̂ ∈ [0k).
To understand the key difference between hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting,
consider how an individual discounts between periods t and t + 1. With quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, one util in t + 1 periods is worth the same as Dt+1
Dt
= δ utils in t periods for
any t > 0. With hyperbolic discounting, one util in t + 1 periods is worth Dt+1
Dt
= 1+kt1+k(t+1)
in t periods, which is increasing and converges to 1 as t goes to infinity. That is, with
hyperbolic discounting, the cost of waiting an additional period decreases as periods get
further into the future. Moreover, waiting an additional period is virtually costless as long
as that period happens far enough in the future.
Richer discount factors, such as hyperbolic, introduce two complications that are absent
in exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounting. First, the welfare criterion is not obvious
when all selves disagree about how to discount the future. Second, the sum of discounted
utility typically does not converge as the horizon grows. For example, with hyperbolic






1 + k · t u(c̄)= +∞
To deal with these issues, we adopt the limit-of-means criterion. Let W HT (c) ≡ u(c1) +
u(c2) + · · · + u(cT ) denote the welfare from consumption stream c = (c1     cT ). This
welfare function corresponds to the utility of an individual evaluating outcomes from a
sufficiently distant past.25
From Proposition 1, the naive agent’s consumption path maximizes
u(c1)+ 1 + (T − 2)k1 + (T − 1)ku(c2)+
1 + (T − 3)k
1 + (T − 1)ku(c3)+ · · · +
1
1 + (T − 1)ku(cT ) (34)
25With quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the only disagreement between selves concerns immediate consump-
tion, which a person disapproves of at every other moment in the person’s life. Because of this, most of the
literature takes the agent’s long-run preferences as the relevant welfare criterion (see footnote 7). We do not
claim that, with hyperbolic discounting, undiscounted payoffs are the only normatively justifiable welfare mea-
sure. A common alternative approach is to treat each self as a different person and adopt a Pareto optimality
criterion. Unfortunately, the incompleteness of the Pareto relation often makes this criterion excessively weak,
especially when disagreement between selves is more pronounced.
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subject to zero profits. Since, for any fixed k, limT↗∞
DT−1
DT−t
= limT↗∞ 1+(T−t)k1+(T−1)k = 1, the ob-
jective function (30) converges to the undiscounted sum.
Let cH ≡ (cH1      cHT ) denote the consumption path of a naive agent, and let c∗ ≡
(c∗1     c
∗
T ) denote the equilibrium consumption for time-consistent agents (k= 0). Note
that time-consistent agents maximize the welfare function W HT . We write W
∗
T = W HT (c∗)
and W HIT = W HT (cH) for the equilibrium welfare of time-consistent and time-inconsistent
agents, respectively.
We make the following technical assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: The utility function satisfies lim supξ↗+∞
(u′(ξ) log(u′(ξ)))2
|u′′(ξ)| <+∞.
Assumption 1 says that u′′(·) does not go to zero too quickly as consumption grows. It
is satisfied, for example, by any CARA preference.26 The proposition below presents the
convergence result for consumers with hyperbolic discounting:








We have previously focused on contracts over consumption. In many applications, par-
ties contract over effort rather than money. This subsection shows that the predictions of
the model are remarkably different when contracting over effort.
Consider an agent who needs to complete a task in at most T ≥ 3 periods. In each
period t ∈ {1    T }, the agent exerts effort et at a cost of C(et). The cost of effort C :
R+ → R+ is increasing, continuous, convex, and satisfies C(0) = 0. Completing the task
requires a total effort of at least ET > 0, so the agent faces the constraint
T∑
t=1
et ≥ ET  (35)
For concreteness, we can think of effort as hours worked and ET as the time it takes to
complete the task. We hold the task fixed for simplicity here, although it is straightforward
to add an ex ante stage in which the task is chosen, making ET endogenous.
To highlight the role of the discount function, we consider the general setting from Sec-
tion 3.5. As in that subsection, we assume that the firm knows the agent’s preferences, that
the agent has all bargaining power, and that parties can commit to long-term contracts.
Firms accept an effort plan as long as they believe that the task will be completed.





26Assumption 1 holds for any CRRA utility with risk aversion greater than 1 and, more generally, for any
HARA utility, u(c) = γ1−γ ( aγ c + b)1−γ , with γ > 1.
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subject to (35). The next proposition characterizes the effort path of a naive agent:
PROPOSITION 3: The effort path of a naive agent coincides with the equilibrium of a time-
consistent agent with discount factor D̃t = Dt1.
Note that the time-consistent agent in the auxiliary program in Proposition 3 has expo-
nential discounting. Since he uses the one-period rate of a present-biased discount func-
tion, (29) implies that he acts more impatiently than a sophisticated agent, who uses his
true discount factor {Dt}. In particular, with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the auxiliary
program has discount factor D̃t = (βδ)t < βδt . Therefore, not only does the inefficiency
from present bias persist, but the naive agent acts even less patiently than a sophisticated
agent. Instead of maximizing his long-run preferences, the agent perpetually chooses ac-
cording to his short-run preferences.
Recall from Proposition 1 that in the consumption model, firms exploit naive agents by
offering a baseline option that postpones consumption until the last period. At the time of
contracting, self 1 uses the long-run discount factor DT−1 to decide how much to consume
now and how much to leave to the last period. Then, each of his future selves deviates
from the baseline, effectively bringing some of this future consumption to the present.
Since the t-period’s self discounts last-period utility by DT−t , the auxiliary program assigns
weight DT−1
DT−t
to actual consumption in period t < T . In particular, this weight equals δt−1
when the agent has quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
With effort, the way to exploit naiveté is to offer a baseline option that requires zero
effort after period 2. When designing the contract, self 1 uses the one-period discount
factor D1 to decide how much effort to exert immediately and how much to leave to
period 2. Then, each of his future selves deviates from the baseline, effectively postponing
some effort into the following period, while thinking that he will not exert any effort
afterwards. Since each self decides how much effort to do immediately and how much
to leave to the following period, along the equilibrium path, effort costs are discounted
using the one-period discount rate: D̃t =Dt1.
More generally, with pleasant tasks (such as consumption), naive agents are exploited
by offering a baseline that postpones these tasks far into the future, making them act
more in line with their long-run discount factors. With unpleasant tasks (such as effort),
they are exploited by offering a baseline that concentrates all future effort in the next
period, making them act according to their short-run discount factors. This explains why
the equilibrium converges to the one that maximizes their long-run preferences in the
former but maximizes their short-run preferences in the latter.27
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study contracting between firms and present-biased consumers. Our
main result is that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon
grows.
Recall that the equilibrium does not depend on the consumer’s naiveté parameter as
long as the consumer is partially naive (β̂ > β), but jumps discontinuously as the con-
sumer becomes sophisticated (β̂= β). But for sophisticated agents, the welfare loss from
27This observation is related to Kőszegi (2005) and Gottlieb (2008), who found that, with three periods and
non-exclusive contracts, there is an asymmetry in the market’s ability to provide commitment for goods with
immediate benefits and delayed costs and those with immediate costs and delayed benefits.
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present bias does not vanish as the horizon grows. Therefore, when T is large, the con-
sumer’s welfare jumps downwards at β̂ = β, meaning that the consumer is harmed by
learning his true present bias. This finding contrasts with a general intuition that educat-
ing behavioral individuals about their biases would increase their welfare.
Learning one’s present bias in our model is hard. First, starting from any belief about
the time-consistency parameter (captured by the naiveté parameter β̂ > β), local updates
do not affect the equilibrium choices or payoffs.28 Second, because consumers who know
their true time-consistency parameter get a lower welfare, there are no incentives to learn.
Note also that under the conditions of Theorem 1, adding restrictions to the space
of contracts cannot benefit consumers if the contracting horizon is long. Under those
conditions, enforcing long-term contracts may be enough to ensure efficiency. We studied
one particular restriction: removing commitment power from consumers. Other examples
of regulations that try to protect consumers include limiting the fees that firms can charge
and allowing consumers to pull out of a contract under certain conditions.
The vanishing inefficiency result generalizes to when the bargaining power is on the
firm’s side or when firms do not know the consumer’s naiveté. However, it breaks down
when firms do not know the consumer’s present bias or when they cannot offer exclusive
contracts. When firms do not know the consumer’s present bias, firms face an adverse
selection problem and the equilibrium consumption corresponds to the least costly sep-
arating allocation, in which all but the most time-consistent type undersave. When they
cannot offer exclusive contracts, the equilibrium fails to provide any commitment devices.
Finally, when contracting over unpleasant rather than pleasant tasks (such as effort in-
stead of consumption), the equilibrium path caters to naive agents’ short-run rather than
long-run preferences, exacerbating instead of dissipating the inefficiency from present
bias.
APPENDIX: SELECTED PROOFS
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2: We establish the result for one-sided commitment
(Theorem 2). The two-sided commitment case (Theorem 1) is similar and, therefore,
omitted.
For each β, let V AT (β) denote the maximum value attained by the solution of the aux-
iliary program with one-sided commitment. Notice that the feasible set is independent
of β. When β = 1, the auxiliary program becomes the time-consistent agent’s program, so
that V AT (1)=W ′CT . Note that limT↗∞(W ′IT −V AT (β)) = limT↗∞(1 −β)EδT−1u(c(sT ))= 0.
Since the objective function is linear in β, it follows from the Envelope Theorem that
∂V AT (β)
∂β
= EδT−1u(c(sT ))≥ δT−1u(0). Applying Lagrange’s Mean Value Theorem gives





) · (1 −β) ≥ δT−1u(0)(1 −β)





) ·β ≥ δT−1u(0)β
28The consumption path is discontinuous in the agent’s naiveté, with “almost sophisticated” agents getting
the same consumption as any other naive agent (which is bounded away from the consumption of a sophisti-
cated agent). However, the consumption path is continuous in the agent’s time-consistency, so “almost time-
consistent” agents get approximately the same consumption as a time-consistent agent.
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V AT (1)− V AT (β)
) ≥ 0 lim inf
T↗∞
(
V AT (β)− V AT (0)
) ≥ 0




V AT (1)− V AT (0)
] ≤ 0












V AT (β)−W ′IT
) = 0
Consider the auxiliary program with one-sided commitment when β = 0, which attains
maximum value V AT (0). Let c
0 ≡ {c0(st) : st ∈ St(s1)1 ≤ t ≤ T } denote a solution to this
program. Since the objective function does not depend on c(sT ) when β= 0, the solution
has the lowest possible value for c(sT ) that still satisfies the constraints: c0(sT ) = w(sT ).
Substituting this equality back, we obtain the same program that determines the consump-
tion of a time-consistent agent with a contracting horizon consisting of the first (T − 1)
periods.
Let cC denote the equilibrium consumption of a time-consistent agent. Since cC is in the
feasible set, income cannot exceed consumption for any last-period state: cC(sT )≥w(sT ).
Therefore, by revealed preference (V AT (0) maximizes expected utility in the first T − 1
periods and uses weakly higher resources), we must have



















where the first line uses the definition of V AT (0), the second line uses revealed preference,







which establishes that lim supT↗+∞[V AT (1)− V AT (0)] ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: Let P∞ ≡ limT↗+∞ PT . We will use the following result, which
is proved in the supplementary appendix:
CLAIM 1: Suppose u is bounded and δ < 1. Then, P∞ exists.
For any outside option c, the equilibrium profit with time-consistent consumers solves










t−1u(c(st)) ≥ E∑Tt=1 δt−1u(c(st)). With time-inconsistent consumers,
the equilibrium profit is determined by
ΠIT (c) := max{c(·)} E
T∑
t=1
w(st)− c(stA    A)
Rt−1









c(stB    B)
) ≥U
where U ≡ u(c(s1))+βE∑t>1 δt−1u(c(st)). Consider the following auxiliary program:

















We claim that the equilibrium consumption for time-inconsistent consumers must solve
the auxiliary program with U ′ = U + (1 −β)u(0)(δ+ · · · + δT−2). To establish this result,










c(stB    B)
)





w(st)− c(stA    A)
Rt−1
≤ V IT (c)
Note that V IT (c) is the maximum profit to the firm when the consumer gets utility U . We
can now follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2 to simplify (IC) and (PC),


















Note that this is the equilibrium program of a dynamically consistent agent who dis-
counts the last period by an extra β. Therefore, the consumption path solves the auxiliary
program with
U ′ =U + (1 −β)u(0)(δ+ · · · + δT−2) (A3)
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We now obtain the convergence result. Since the participation constraints must be bind-











′)) +βδT−1u(cA(sT U ′))
]
=U ′
where cA := (cA(s1U ′)     cA(sT U ′)) denotes the equilibrium consumption in the aux-















) +βδT−1u(cA(sT )) + (1 −β)δT−1u(cA(sT ))
]
=U ′ +E[(1 −β)δT−1u(cA(sT ))] (A4)
where the first line uses the definition of Ŵ IT (c), the second line comes from algebraic
manipulations, and the third line comes from (A2). Choose an outside option, c′, for a









) =U ′ (A5)
The existence of c′ is guaranteed because we can pick c′1 = c1 and u(c′(st))= βu(c(st))+
(1 −β)u(0), ∀t ≥ 2. Moreover, since c′(st)≤ c(st), condition (26) holds for c′.
Combining (A4) and (A5), we obtain
Ŵ IT (c)= Ŵ CT
(
c′
) +E[(1 −β)δT−1u(cA(sT ))]
and, since u bounded and δ < 1, it follows that
lim
T↗∞
∣∣Ŵ CT (c′) − Ŵ IT (c)∣∣ = lim
T↗∞
∣∣E[(1 −β)δT−1u(cA(sT ))]∣∣ = 0
We now turn to the firm’s profit in the program (A1). Let λ denote the Lagrangian



























) +βδT−1u(c(sT )) −U ′
]

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Differentiating with respect to β leads to
∂ΠTβ
∂β
=E[λδT−1u(cA(sT ))] ≥ λδT−1u(0)
where the inequality uses cA(sT )≥ 0. Applying Lagrange’s Mean Value Theorem gives




(1 −β) ≥ λδT−1u(0)(1 −β)









the inequality uses cA(s1)≤K from condition (26). As T ↗ ∞, we obtain
lim inf
T↗∞
(ΠT1 −ΠTβ)≥ 0 lim inf
T↗∞
(ΠTβ −ΠT0) ≥ 0
Note that ΠT1 = ΠCT (c′) and ΠTβ = ΠIT (c). To show that limT↗∞(ΠT1 − ΠTβ) = 0, it is
sufficient to show that lim supT↗∞(ΠT1 −ΠT0)= 0. The program for ΠT0 is










Since c(sT ) does not appear in the constraint, c(sT )= 0. The program reduces to
















t−1u(c(st)) ≥ U ′. Note that ΠT0 maximizes the objective from the
(T − 1)-period program with β = 1 (plus the constant E[w(sT )








Since the NPV of income is assumed to be bounded (condition (26)), it follows that
limT↗∞ E[w(sT )RT−1 ] = 0. Then,
lim sup
T↗∞











where the first step comes from (A6), the second step comes from limT↗∞ E[w(sT )RT−1 ] = 0,
and the last step is because the limit of ΠT1 exists (Claim 1). Since ΠT1 is the problem
for time-consistent consumers with the outside option c′ and ΠTβ is the problem for
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time-inconsistent consumers with the outside option c, it follows that limT↗∞ |ΠCT (c′) −
ΠIT (c)| = 0.
To recap, we have shown that there exists an outside option c′ such that
lim
T↗∞
∣∣Ŵ CT (c′) − Ŵ IT (c)∣∣ = 0 lim
T↗∞
∣∣ΠCT (c′) −ΠIT (c)∣∣ = 0
This establishes that (Ŵ IT (c)Π
I
T (c)) converges to a point on the Pareto frontier for time-
consistent consumers (first part of the theorem): limT↗∞(Ŵ IT (c)Π
I
T (c)) ∈P∞.
We now prove the second part of the theorem. Recall that a time-inconsistent con-
sumer’s welfare in the equilibrium limT↗∞ Ŵ IT (c)= limT↗∞ U ′, where
lim
T↗∞
























) + (1 −β)u(0)≤ u(c(st)) ∀t
The inequality is strict for at least one ct(st) because of condition (27). So a time-
inconsistent consumer is worse off contracting with the firm in that he receives lower
welfare in the equilibrium than the welfare he would have received by consuming the
outside option. The third part follows from the definition of the Pareto frontier and the
second part of the theorem. Q.E.D.







ct(B    B)
)











ct(BB    B)
)










ct(AB    B)
)
 ∀τ ≥ 2 (A8)
As in the proof of Lemma 2, there exists a solution in which the baseline option shifts
all intermediate consumption to the last period:
c2(B)= c3(BB)= · · · = cT−1(B    B) = 0 (A9)
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naive agent is indifferent between the original contract and this new one, and both con-
tracts have the same consumption path. Since we focus on the consumption path, we can
without loss of generality work with (A9). Using the same argument, self t ≥ 2’s perceived
consumption stream also features shifting all intermediate consumption to the last period:
ct+1(A    A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
B)= · · · = cT−1(A    A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
B    B︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−t−1
)= 0.
Substituting in the binding IC constraints (A7), we obtain the objective function in our





u(ct(A    A)). Q.E.D.






















et(BB    B)
)










et(AB    B)
)
 ∀τ ≥ 2 (PC)
The (IC) at time τ = 2 must be binding (otherwise, we could decrease eT (B    B), im-
proving the objective). We claim that et(B    B) = 0 for t ≥ 3. Suppose otherwise that
et(B    B) > 0 for some t. Consider a perturbation that shifts effort in the baseline from
period t to period 2: C(e2(B)) + ε and C(et(B    B)) − εDt−2 . This perturbation keeps
(IC) unchanged, relaxes (PC), and lowers the objective function by (D1 − Dt−1Dt−2 )ε ≤ 0. By
the same argument, self t ≥ 2’s perceived effort path also shifts all future effort to period
t + 1:
et+2(A    A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
BB)= · · · = eT−1(A    A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
B    B︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−t−1
)= eT (A    A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
B    B︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−t−1
)= 0

































et(AB    B)
))





et(A    A)
)

where the first and third equations come from C(0) = 0, and the second and forth equa-
tions come from the binding ICs for selves 2 and 3, respectively; the fifth and sixth equa-
tions come from iterating the same procedure as in the first four equations.
It is straightforward to check that (PC) are slack and can be ignored, so the effort
path of a naive agent is the same as with a time-consistent agent with discount factor
D̃t =Dt1. Q.E.D.
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